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Perception and Reason$

Bill Brewer

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199250455

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199250456.001.0001

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(p.269) Bibliography

(p.269) Bibliography

Source:
Perception and Reason
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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