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Incentives and Political Economy$
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Jean-Jacques Laffont

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248681

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199248680.001.0001

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Checks and Balances

Checks and Balances

Chapter:
(p.73) 4 Checks and Balances
Source:
Incentives and Political Economy
Author(s):

Jean‐Jacques Laffont (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199248680.003.0004

This chapter studies the design of reciprocal supervision between members of the same hierarchy. It is shown that reciprocal capture may result in the form of a horizontal level exchange of favours, which is costly to society. An example is also given where collusion is beneficial as it affects transaction costs in some states of nature.

Keywords:   collusion, exchange of favours, hierarchy, reciprocal capture, reciprocal supervision, social costs, transaction costs

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