Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Engaging ReasonOn the Theory of Value and Action$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Joseph Raz

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248001

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199248001.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 11 December 2017

The Amoralist

The Amoralist

Chapter:
(p.273) 12 The Amoralist
Source:
Engaging Reason
Author(s):

Joseph Raz (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199248001.003.0013

The question of what an agent has reason to act on is approached via the question of what it is that an agent values. The distinction between acting for moral versus non‐moral reasons is argued to be obscure and not overly helpful. What we should attempt to demonstrate is the relations between the reasons that agents standardly act on. By taking this approach, we find that we no longer feel the need to advance a defence of moral reasons as categorical reasons for action.

Keywords:   action, amoralism, morality, practical reason, value

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .