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Truth and ParadoxSolving the Riddles$

Tim Maudlin

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247295

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199247293.001.0001

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(p.204) References

(p.204) References

Source:
Truth and Paradox
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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Reprinted in Martin (1984: 175–235).

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