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Truth and Paradox
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Truth and Paradox: Solving the Riddles

Tim Maudlin

Abstract

At least since the work of Tarski, the Liar paradox has stood in the way of an acceptable account of the notion of truth. It has been less noticed that once one admits a truth predicate into a formal language, along with intuitively valid inferences involving the truth predicate, standard classical logic becomes inconsistent. So, any acceptable account of truth must both explicate how sentences get the truth values they have and amend classical logic to avoid the inconsistency. A natural account of a trivalent semantics arises from treating the problem of assigning truth values to sentences as ... More

Keywords: bivalence, S. Kripke, Liar, logic, paradox, semantics, A. Tarski, truth

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2004 Print ISBN-13: 9780199247295
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005 DOI:10.1093/0199247293.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Tim Maudlin, author
Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University, New Jersey
Author Webpage