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The Metaphysics of TheismAquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles I$
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Norman Kretzmann

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199246533

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019924653X.001.0001

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(p.197) Seven Will
The Metaphysics of Theism

Norman Kretzmann

Oxford University Press

Since intellect and will are conceptually distinct, and since intellect without will would not constitute a person, showing that personhood must be attributed to reality's ultimate principle remains incomplete until it can be shown to be characterized essentially by will as well. Before taking up Aquinas's arguments for will in God, his conception of will generally is examined, as the absolutely universal appetitus for what is good, associated with all being. Aquinas's arguments proposing to derive divine will from divine intellect as well as the argument from freedom are presented. The Dionysian principle, which Aquinas accepts: goodness is by its very nature diffusive of itself and (thereby) of being, commits him to a necessitarian explanation of God's willing of things other than himself.

Keywords:   appetitus, Aquinas, Dionysian principle, divine intellect, divine will, freedom of choice, God, necessitarian explanation, personhood

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