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The Metaphysics of TheismAquinas's Natural Theology in Summa contra gentiles I$
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Norman Kretzmann

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199246533

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019924653X.001.0001

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From Independence to Perfection

From Independence to Perfection

(p.113) Four From Independence to Perfection
The Metaphysics of Theism

Norman Kretzmann

Oxford University Press

Identifying an acknowledged first cause as God requires further argumentation to show that this extraordinary entity must have characteristics that pick out the supreme being of the monotheistic tradition and to show that it must be the transcendent, personal, omniscient, omnipotent, perfectly good creator, and governor of the universe. By means of the exclusive application of the eliminative method to an immutable first cause, Aquinas's account leads to eliminating the distinction between its nature and being, to its essential nature being identical with its own unique, necessary, and ultimately explanatory being. Through Aquinas's perfection argument, the ultimately explanatory being is also shown to be universally perfect.

Keywords:   Aquinas, divine nature, eliminative method, first cause, God, necessary being, transcendence, universal perfection

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