Show Summary Details
- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Illustration
- Preface
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy
- 1 Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes
- 2 The Wave of Power‐Sharing Democracy
- 3 Institutions and Coalition Building in Post‐Communist Transitions
- 4 Presidents, Parliaments, and Democracy: Insights from the Post‐Communist World
- 5 Presidentialism and Democratic Performance
- 6 Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy
- 7 Federalism and State‐Building: Post‐Communist and Post‐Colonial Perspectives
- 8 Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, and Democratization
- 9 Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve
- 10 Constitutional Engineering in Post‐Coup Fiji
- 11 The Belfast Agreement and the British‐Irish Agreement: Consociation, Confederal Institutions, a Federacy, and a Peace Process
- 12 The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of Process and Substance
- 13 Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules
- 14 Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria
- 15 Ethnic Diversities, Constitutional Designs, and Public Policies in India
- References
- Index
(p.xiii) List of Figures
(p.xiii) List of Figures
- Source:
- The Architecture of Democracy
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Illustration
- Preface
- List of Figures
- List of Tables
- Contributors
- Introduction: Institutional Design, Conflict Management, and Democracy
- 1 Constitutional Design: Proposals Versus Processes
- 2 The Wave of Power‐Sharing Democracy
- 3 Institutions and Coalition Building in Post‐Communist Transitions
- 4 Presidents, Parliaments, and Democracy: Insights from the Post‐Communist World
- 5 Presidentialism and Democratic Performance
- 6 Constitutional Asymmetries: Communal Representation, Federalism, and Cultural Autonomy
- 7 Federalism and State‐Building: Post‐Communist and Post‐Colonial Perspectives
- 8 Ballots not Bullets: Testing Consociational Theories of Ethnic Conflict, Electoral Systems, and Democratization
- 9 Designing Electoral Rules and Waiting for an Electoral System to Evolve
- 10 Constitutional Engineering in Post‐Coup Fiji
- 11 The Belfast Agreement and the British‐Irish Agreement: Consociation, Confederal Institutions, a Federacy, and a Peace Process
- 12 The Eritrean Experience in Constitution Making: The Dialectic of Process and Substance
- 13 Indonesia's Democratic Transition: Playing by the Rules
- 14 Institutional Design, Ethnic Conflict Management, and Democracy in Nigeria
- 15 Ethnic Diversities, Constitutional Designs, and Public Policies in India
- References
- Index