Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Knowledge and its Place in Nature$

Hilary Kornblith

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199246311

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199246319.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 26 February 2017

(p.178) Bibliography

(p.178) Bibliography

Knowledge and its Place in Nature
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

Achinstein, Peter, The Concept of Evidence (Oxford University Press, 1983).

Alcock, John, Animal Behavior: An Evolutionary Approach (Sinauer Associates, 1975).

Allen, Colin, ‘Mental Content’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 43 (1992), 537–53.

—— ‘Animal Pain’, manuscript.

Allen, Colin, and Bekoff, Marc, Species of Mind: The Philosophy and Biology of Cognitive Ethology (MIT Press, 1997).

Allen, Colin, Bekoff, Mark, and Lauder, George (eds), Nature's Purposes: Analyses of Function and Design in Biology (MIT Press, 1998).

Astington, Janet Wilde, The Child's Discovery of the Mind (Harvard University Press, 1993).

Ayer, A. J., The Concept of a Person and Other Essays (Macmillan, 1964).

Balda, R. P., Pepperberg, I. M., and Kamil, A. C. (eds), Animal Cognition in Nature: The Convergence of Psychology and Biology in Laboratory and Field (Academic Press, 1998).

Barkow, Jerome H., Cosmides, Leda, and Tooby, John (eds), The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture (Oxford University Press, 1992).

Bealer, George, ‘The Philosophical Limits of Scientific Essentialism’, Philosophical Perspectives, 1 (1987), 289–365.

—— ‘The Incoherence of Empiricism’, in S. Wagner and R. Warner (eds), Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal (Notre Dame University Press, 1993), 163–96.

—— ‘Intuition and the Autonomy of Philosophy’, in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds) (1998), 201–39.

(p.179) Bekoff, Marc, and Jamieson, Dale (eds), Interpretation and Explanation in the Study of Animal Behavior, i. Interpretation, Intentionality, and Communication (Westview, 1990).

Bender, John (ed), The Current State of the Coherence Theory: Critical Essays on the Epistemic Theories of Keith Lehrer and Laurence BonJour, with Replies (Kluwer, 1989).

Bermúdez, José Luis, The Paradox of Self‐Consciousness, MIT Press, 1998.

BonJour, Laurence, The Structure of Empirical Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 1985).

—— ‘Replies and Clarifications’, in Bender (ed) (1989), 276–92.

—— ‘Against Naturalistic Epistemology’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19 (1994), 283–300.

—— ‘The Dialectic of Foundationalism and Coherentism’, in J. Greco and E. Sosa (eds) (1999), 117–42.

—— ‘Toward a Defense of Empirical Foundationalism’, in Michael DePaul (ed), Resurrecting Old‐Fashioned Foundationalism (Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 21–38.

Boyd, Richard, ‘How to Be a Moral Realist’, in Geoffrey Sayre‐McCord (ed), Essays on Moral Realism (Cornell University Press, 1988), 181–228.

Brandom, Robert, Making It Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment (Harvard University Press, 1994).

—— ‘Insights and Blindspots of Reliabilism’, Monist, 81 (1998), 371–92.

—— Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism (Harvard University Press, 2000).

Brink, David, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge University Press, 1989).

Butchvarov, Panayot, The Concept of Knowledge (Northwestern University Press, 1970).

Carey, Susan, and Xu, Fei, ‘Infants' Knowledge of Objects: Beyond Object Files and Object Tracking’, Cognition, 40 (2001), 1–35.

Cheney, Dorothy, and Seyfarth, Robert, How Monkeys See the World (University of Chicago Press, 1990).

Cherniak, Christopher, ‘Computational Complexity and the Universal Acceptance of Logic’, Journal of Philosophy, 81 (1984), 739–58.

—— Minimal Rationality (MIT Press, 1986).

Chisholm, Roderick, Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edn. (Prentice‐Hall, 1977).

(p.180) Cummins, Denise Dellarosa, and Allen, Colin (eds), The Evolution of Mind (Oxford University Press, 1998).

Daniels, Norman, ‘Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics’, repr. in Justice and Justification: Reflective Equilibrium in Theory and Practice (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Davidson, Donald, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford University Press, 1984).

—— ‘Reply to Simon J. Evnine’, in Hahn (ed) (1999), 305–10.

Dennett, Daniel, Content and Consciousness (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969).

—— Brainstorms (Bradford Books, 1978).

—— The Intentional Stance (MIT Press, 1987).

DePaul, Michael, and Ramsey, William (eds), Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and Its Role in Philosophical Inquiry (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998).

Descartes, René, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, ed. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (2 vols; Cambridge University Press, 1931).

Devitt, Michael, ‘The Methodology of Naturalistic Semantics’, Journal of Philosophy, 91 (1994), 545–72.

Dretske, Fred, ‘Two Conceptions of Knowledge: Rational vs. Reliable Belief’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 4 (1991), 15–30.

Elgin, Catherine, ‘The Epistemic Efficacy of Stupidity’, Synthese, 74 (1988), 297–311.

Evnine, Simon, ‘On the Way to Language’, in Hahn (ed) (1999), 289–304.

Field, Hartry, ‘Realism and Relativism’, Journal of Philosophy, 79 (1982), 553–67.

Fodor, Jerry, The Language of Thought (Thomas Y. Crowell, 1975).

—— ‘Special Sciences’, in Representations: Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science (MIT Press, 1981).

—— The Modularity of Mind (MIT Press, 1983).

—— ‘Why Paramecia Don't Have Mental Representations’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 10 (1986), 3–23.

—— Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong (Oxford University Press, 1998).

—— The Mind Doesn't Work that Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology (MIT Press, 2000).

Fogelin, Robert, Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification (Oxford University Press, 1994).

(p.181) Fumerton, Richard, ‘Skepticism and Naturalistic Epistemology’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19 (1994), 321–40.

—— ‘A Priori Philosophy after an A Posteriori Turn’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 23 (1999), 21–33.

Gibbard, Allan, ‘Thoughts, Norms and Discursive Practice: Commentary on Robert Brandom, Making It Explicit’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 56 (1996), 699–717.

Godfrey‐Smith, Peter, Complexity and the Function of Mind in Nature (Cambridge University Press, 1998).

Goldman, Alvin, Epistemology and Cognition (Harvard University Press, 1986).

—— ‘Psychology and Philosophical Analysis’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 89 (1988), 195–209.

—— Liaisons: Philosophy Meets the Cognitive and Social Sciences (MIT Press, 1992).

Goldman, Alvin, and Pust, Joel, ‘Philosophical Theory and Intuitional Evidence’, in DePaul and Ramsey (eds) (1998).

Gopnik, Alison, and Meltzoff, Andrew, Words, Thoughts, and Theories (MIT Press, 1997).

Gould, Stephen Jay, and Lewontin, Richard, ‘The Spandrels of San Marcos and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptationist Programme’, Proceedings of the Royal Society of London, 205 (1978), 281–8.

Gould, Stephen Jay, and Vrba, Elisabeth, ‘Exaptation—A Missing Term in the Science of Form’, Paleobiology, 8 (1982), 4–15.

Greco, John, and Sosa, Ernest, The Blackwell Guide to Epistemology (Blackwell, 1999).

Griffin, Donald, The Question of Animal Awareness, 2nd edn. (Rockefeller University Press, 1981).

—— Animal Thinking (Harvard University Press, 1984).

—— Animal Minds (University of Chicago Press, 1992).

Hahn, Lewis (ed), The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Open Court, 1999).

Hahn, Lewis, and Schillp, Paul (eds), The Philosophy of W. V. Quine (Open Court, 1986).

Hart, H. L. A., The Concept of Law (Oxford University Press, 1961).

Haugeland, John, Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind (Harvard University Press, 1998).

Hauser, Marc, The Evolution of Communication (MIT Press, 1996).

(p.182) Hauser, Marc, Wild Minds: What Animals Really Think (Henry Holt, 2000).

Heinrich, Bernd, Mind of the Raven: Investigations and Adventures with Wolf‐Birds (Harper Collins, 1999).

Herman, Louis, and Morrel‐Samuels, Palmer, ‘Knowledge Acquisition and Asymmetry Between Language Comprehension and Production: Dolphins and Apes as General Models for Animals’, in M. Bekoff and D. Jamieson (eds) (1990), 283–312.

Hobson, R. Peter, ‘On Not Understanding Minds’, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 61 (1996), 153–60.

Horgan, Terry, ‘The Austere Ideology of Folk Psychology’, Mind and Language, 8 (1993), 282–97.

Horgan, Terry, and Graham, George, ‘Southern Fundamentalism and the End of Philosophy’, Philosophical Issues, 5 (1994), 219–47.

Jackson, Frank, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis (Oxford University Press, 1998).

Kahneman, Daniel, Slovic, Paul, and Tversky, Amos (eds), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases (Cambridge University Press, 1982).

Kaplan, Mark, ‘Epistemology Denatured’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 19 (1994), 350–65.

Kornblith, Hilary, ‘Justified Belief and Epistemically Responsible Action’, Philosophical Review, 92 (1983), 33–48.

—— ‘Ever Since Descartes’, Monist, 68 (1985), 264–76.

—— ‘Naturalizing Rationality’, in N. Garver and P. Hare (eds), Naturalism and Rationality (Prometheus Books), 115–33.

—— ‘Introspection and Misdirection’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 67 (1989), 410–22.

—— ‘The Unattainability of Coherence’, in J. Bender (ed), The Current State of the Coherence Theory (Kluwer, 1989), 207–14.

—— ‘Epistemic Normativity’, Synthèse, 94 (1993), 357–76.

—— Inductive Inference and Its Natural Ground (MIT Press, 1993).

—— ‘A Conservative Approach to Social Epistemology’, in Fred Schmitt (ed), Socializing Epistemology (Rowman & Littlefield, 1994), 93–110.

—— ‘Naturalistic Epistemology and Its Critics’, Philosophical Topics, 23 (1995), 237–55.

—— ‘The Role of Intuition in Philosophical Inquiry’, in M. DePaul and W. Ramsey (eds) (1998), 129–41.

(p.183) —— ‘Knowledge in Humans and Other Animals’, Philosophical Perspectives, 13 (1999), 327–46.

—— ‘Sosa on Human and Animal Knowledge’, in J. Greco (ed), Sosa and His Critics (Blackwell, forthcoming).

Lehrer, Keith, Meta‐Mind (Oxford University Press, 1990).

—— ‘Discursive Knowledge’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60 (2000), 637–53.

Lewis, David, Philosophical Papers (2 vols; Oxford University Press, 1983; 1986).

Lewontin, Richard, ‘The Evolution of Cognition’, in D. Osherson and E. Smith (eds) (1990).

Lord, C., Ross, L., and Lepper, M., ‘Biased Assimilation and Attitude Polarization: The Effects of Prior Theories on Subsequently Considered Evidence’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34 (1979).

Lycan, William, ‘ “Is” and “Ought” in Cognitive Science’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4 (1981), 344–5.

—— Judgment and Justification (Cambridge University Press, 1988).

Marler, Peter, Karkahian, Stephen, and Gyger, Marcel, ‘Do Animals Have the Option of Withholding Signals When Communication is Inappropriate? The Audience Effect’, in C. Ristau (ed) (1991), 187–208.

McGinn, Colin, ‘The Concept of Knowledge’, Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 9 (1984), 529–54.

Miller, George, ‘The Magical Number Seven Plus or Minus Two: Some Limits on Our Capacity for Processing Information’, in The Psychology of Communication (Basic Books, 1967).

Miller, Richard W., Moral Differences: Truth, Justice, and Conscience in a World of Conflict (Princeton University Press, 1992).

Millikan, Ruth, Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories (MIT Press, 1984).

—— White Queen Psychology and Other Essays for Alice (MIT Press, 1993).

—— On Clear and Confused Ideas: An Essay about Substance Concepts (Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Nagel, Thomas, The View from Nowhere (Oxford University Press, 1986).

Nisbett, Richard, and Ross, Lee, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment (Prentice‐Hall, 1980).

Nozick, Robert, Philosophical Explanations (Harvard University Press, 1981).

(p.184) Osherson, Daniel, and Smith, Edward (eds), Thinking: An Invitation to Cognitive Science (MIT Press, 1990), iii.

Pepperberg, Irene, The Alex Studies: Cognitive and Communicative Abilities of Grey Parrots (Harvard University Press, 1999).

Pereboom, Derk, and Kornblith, Hilary, ‘The Metaphysics of Irreducibility’, Philosophical Studies, 63 (1991), 131–51.

Pinker, Steven, How the Mind Works (W. W. Norton, 1997).

Plotkin, Henry, Darwin Machines and the Nature of Knowledge (Harvard University Press, 1994).

Povinelli, Daniel, Folk Physics for Apes: The Chimpanzee's Theory of How the World Works (Oxford University Press, 2000).

Povinelli, Daniel, and Eddy, Timothy, ‘What Young Chimpanzees Know about Seeing’, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 61 (1996), 1–152.

Putnam, Hilary, ‘Brains and Behavior’, in Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers (Cambridge University Press, 1975), ii. 325–41.

Quine, W. V. O., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (Columbia University Press, 1969).

—— ‘Reply to Morton White’, in Lewis Hahn and Paul Schilpp (eds) (1986), 663–5.

Railton, Peter, ‘Moral Realism’, Philosophical Review, 95 (1986), 163–207.

—— ‘Facts and Values’, Philosophical Topics, 14 (1986), 5–31.

Ristau, Carolyn (ed), Cognitive Ethology: The Minds of Other Animals: Essays in Honor of Donald R. Griffin (Lawrence Erlbaum, 1991).

—— ‘Aspects of the Cognitive Ethology of an Injury‐Feigning Bird, the Piping Plover’, in Ristau (ed) (1991).

Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind (Barnes & Noble, 1949).

—— ‘Autobiographical’, in Ryle: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. O. P. Wood and G. Pitcher (Doubleday, 1970).

Sayre‐McCord, Geoffrey (ed), Essays on Moral Realism (Cornell University Press, 1988).

Scholl, Brian J., and Leslie, Alan M., ‘Explaining the Infant's Object Concept: Beyond the Perception/Cognition Dichotomy’, in E. LePore and Z. Pylyshyn (eds), What Is Cognitive Science? (Blackwell, 1999), 26–73.

Sellars, Wilfrid, ‘Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man’, in Science, Perception and Reality (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963).

Shettleworth, Sara, Cognition, Evolution and Behavior (Oxford University Press, 1998).

(p.185) Shoemaker, Sydney, The First‐Person Perspective and Other Essays (Cambridge University Press, 1996).

Siegel, Harvey, ‘Empirical Psychology, Naturalized Epistemology and First Philosophy’, Philosophy of Science, 51 (1984), 667–76.

Sober, Elliott, Philosophy of Biology, 2nd edn. (Westview, 2000).

Sorabji, Richard, Animal Minds and Human Morals: The Origins of the Western Debate (Cornell University Press, 1993).

Sosa, Ernest, Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

—— ‘Reflective Knowledge in the Best Circles’, Journal of Philosophy, 94 (1997), 410–30.

Stein, Edward, Without Good Reason: The Rationality Debate in Philosophy and Cognitive Science (Oxford University Press, 1996).

Stich, Stephen, The Fragmentation of Reason (MIT Press, 1990).

Sturgeon, Nicholas, ‘Moral Explanations’, 1985; repr. in G. Sayre‐McCord (ed) (1988).

—— ‘Harman on Moral Explanations of Natural Facts’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 24 (1986).

—— ‘What Difference Does Moral Realism Make?’, Southern Journal of Philosophy, suppl. vol. 24 (1986).

Tomasello, Michael, ‘Chimpanzee Social Cognition’, Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 61 (1996), 161–73.

Tomasello, Michael, and Call, Josep, Primate Cognition (Oxford University Press, 1997).

Tversky, Amos, and Kahneman, Daniel, ‘Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases’, repr. in Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky (eds) (1982).

Vauclair, Jacques, Animal Cognition: An Introduction to Modern Comparative Psychology (Harvard University Press, 1996).

Wason, Peter, ‘On the Failure to Eliminate Hypotheses in a Conceptual Task’, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12 (1960), 129–40.

Wason, Peter, and Johnson‐Laird, Philip, Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Content (Harvard University Press, 1972).

Williams, G. C., Adaptation and Natural Selection (Princeton University Press, 1966).

Williams, Michael, Unnatural Doubt: Epistemological Realism and the Basis of Scepticism (Princeton University Press, 1996).

—— Groundless Belief: An Essay on the Possibility of Epistemology, 2nd edn. (Princeton University Press, 1999).

(p.186) Williams, Michael, ‘Dretske on Epistemic Entitlement’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 60 (2000), 607–12.

—— Problems of Knowledge: A Critical Introduction to Philosophical Epistemology (Oxford University Press, 2001).

Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, 3rd edn. (Macmillan, 1953).