B. Reply to Quine on Events - Oxford Scholarship Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Essays on Actions and Events$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Donald Davidson

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199246274

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199246270.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2015. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 30 September 2016

(p.305) B. Reply to Quine on Events

(p.305) B. Reply to Quine on Events

Source:
Essays on Actions and Events
Author(s):

Donald Davidson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199246270.005.0003

Davidson starts off by contrasting his semantic approach to Quine's: whereas he reads off ontic commitments from natural languages as they are, Quine is willing to revise them in favour of a ‘language of science’. Davidson points out how that difference in approach has led them to diverging accounts of belief sentences (intensional contexts). He then retracts the individuation conditions he offered for events (in Essay 8) in terms of their causes and effects, conceding the circularity Quine spots in them. Recognizing that ordinary enduring objects with vague boundaries fare no better (explosions and mountains lack clear individuation conditions too), Davidson rests satisfied that events present not only a comparably permissible but also an indispensable ontological category to explain the workings of natural language.

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .