Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Uses of SenseWittgenstein's Philosophy of Language$

Charles Travis

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199245871

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199245878.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 21 June 2018

(p.393) Bibliography

(p.393) Bibliography

Source:
The Uses of Sense
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

Austin, J. L. [1946], ‘Other Minds’, in his Philosophical Papers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1961.

—— [1950], ‘Truth’, in his Philosophical Papers.

—— [1952/3], ‘How to Talk:—Some Simple Ways’, in his Philosophical Papers.

—— [1962], How to do things with Words, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962.

Blackburn, S. [1984], ‘The Individual Strikes Back’, Synthese, vol. 58/3, March 1984, pp. 281–301.

Chihara, C., and Fodor, J., [1965], ‘Operationalism and Ordinary Language’, The American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 2/4, 1965, pp. 281–95.

Cook Wilson, J. [1926], Statement and Inference, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1926.

Davidson, D. [1973], ‘Radical Interpretation’, in his Truth and Interpretation, Oxford University Press. 1984.

Descartes [1637], Discourse on the Method in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, Cambridge University Press, London and New York, 1967.

Donnellan, K. [1972], ‘Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions’, in D. Davidson and G. Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1972, pp. 356–79.

Dummett, M. [1973], ‘The Philosophical Basis of Intuitionistic Logic’, in his Truth and Other Enigmas, Duckworth, London, 1978.

—— [1981], The Interpretation of Frege's Philosophy, Duckworth, London, 1981.

Frege, G. [1918], ‘The Thought’, in his Logical Investigations, ad P. Geach, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1977.

Gilbert, M. [1983], ‘On The Question Whether Language Has a Social Nature: Some Aspects of Winch and Others on Wittgenstein’, Synthese, vol. 56, 1983, pp. 301–18.

Kaplan, D. [1988], ‘Demonstratives’, in Themes From Kaplan, ed. J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988.

Kripke, S. [1972], Naming And Necessity, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1980. (First appeared in Semantics of Natural Language, 1972.)

—— [1979], ‘A Puzzle About Belief’, in A. Margalit, ed., Meaning and Use, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1979, pp. 239–83. (p.394)

—— [1982], Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.

Leibniz, G.W. [1686], Discours de Métaphysique, ed. G. Le Roy, Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1970.

—— [1703], Nouveaux Essais Sur L'Entendement Humain, ed. J. Brunschwig, Garnier‐Flammarion, Paris, 1966.

McDowell, J. [1977], ‘On the Sense And Reference Of A Proper Name’, Mind, vol. 86, 1977, pp. 159–85.

—— [1981], ‘Anti‐Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding’, in H. Parret and J. Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1981, pp. 225–48.

—— [1982], ‘Criteria, Defeasibility and Knowledge’, The Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 68, 1982, pp. 455–79.

—— [1986], ‘Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space’, in P. Pettit and J. McDowell, eds., Subject Thought And Context, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986, pp. 137–68.

Malcolm, N. [1952/63], ‘Knowledge and Belief’, Mind, vol. NS 242, April, 1952,

reprinted in significantly revised form in his Knowledge and Certainty, Prentice‐Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 1963.

Moore, G. E. [1925], ‘A Defence of Common Sense’, in J. H. Muirhead, ed., Contemporary British Philosophy, second series, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1925.

—— [1939], ‘Proof of an External World’, The Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. 25, 1939, pp. 273–300.

Peacocke, C. [1986], Thought: an Essay on Content, Aristotelian Society Series, vol. 4, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986.

Prichard, H. A. [1950], Knowledge and Perception, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1950.

Putnam, H. [1962a], ‘What Theories Are Not’, in his Mathematics, Matter and Method, Philosophical Papers, vol. 1, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.

—— [1962b], ‘The Analytic and the Synthetic’, in his Mind, Language and Reality, Philosophical Papers, vol. 2, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1975.

—— [1962c], ‘Dreaming and Depth Grammar’, in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2.

—— [1970], ‘On Properties’, in Philosophical Papers, vol. 1.

—— [1975], ‘The Refutation of Conventionalism’, in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2.

—— [1981], Reason Truth And History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.

Quine, W. v. O. [1960], Word and Object, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1960.

Russell, B. [1918], ‘The Philosophy of Logical Atomism’, in his Logic and Knowledge, ed., R. C. Marsh, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1956.

Salmon, N. [1982], Reference and Essence, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1982.

Stroud, B. [1984], The Significance of Philosophical Scepticism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1984. (p.395)

Travis, C. [1975], Saying and Understanding, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1975.

—— [1981], The True and the False, J. Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1981.

—— [1983/4], ‘Are Belief Ascriptions Opaque?’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series, vol. 84, 1983/4, pp. 73–99.

—— [1985], ‘On What is Strictly Speaking True’, The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 152, June 1985, pp. 187–229.

Wittgenstein, L. [1958], Philosopical Investigations, second edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1958.

—— [1969], Über Gewissheit/On Certainty, trans. D. Paul and G. E. M. Anscombe, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1969.

Vendler, Z. [1977], Res Cogitans, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1977.

Wright, C. [1985], ‘Facts and Certainty’, Henriette Hertz Lecture for the British Academy, delivered 11 December, 1985.

—— [1986a], ‘Rule Following, Meaning and Constructivism’, in Meaning And Interpretation, ed., C. Travis, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, pp. 271–57.

—— [1986b], ‘Does Philosophical Investigations I. 258–260 Suggest a Cogent Argument against Private Language?’, in Pettit and McDowell, eds., Subject Thought And Context, pp. 209–66.