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Reference and Consciousness$
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John Campbell

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199243815

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199243816.001.0001

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Dispositional Vs. Categorical

Dispositional Vs. Categorical

(p.235) 12 Dispositional Vs. Categorical
Reference and Consciousness

John Campbell (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

I have emphasized that we need the relational view of experience to explain how it is that we have the conception of objects and properties as categorical. Some, though, have said that we have only the conception of objects and properties as complexes of dispositions. I use a puzzle of Shoemaker's to show that if we abandon the conception of the categorical, we lose our grip on the notion of the existence of individual objects altogether.

Keywords:   categorical, dispositional, existence, objects, relational

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