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Reference and Consciousness$
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John Campbell

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199243815

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199243816.001.0001

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Indeterminacy and Inscrutability

Indeterminacy and Inscrutability

Chapter:
(p.216) 11 Indeterminacy and Inscrutability
Source:
Reference and Consciousness
Author(s):

John Campbell (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199243816.003.0012

Quine's notion of stimulus meaning did not give due weight to the phenomenon of attention; but that means the notion of stimulus meaning is ill defined. When we take attention into account, however, we also have to acknowledge that attention is allocated to objects. It thus appears that there is no standpoint from which to state Quine's thesis that the data underdetermine the ascriptions of references to our terms. I also look at the implications of the present approach for the indeterminacy of translation.

Keywords:   attention, indeterminacy, inscrutability, reference, stimulus meaning

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