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Epistemic Justification$
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Richard Swinburne

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199243792

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199243794.001.0001

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(p.56) 3 Probability
Epistemic Justification

Richard Swinburne (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Physical probability is a measure of the extent to which an event is predetermined by its causes. Statistical probability is a measure of the proportion of events of some kind in a population; I distinguish the proportion in an actual population from the proportion in a hypothetical population (a population that would be generated by a certain process). Inductive probability is a measure of the extent to which one proposition makes another one likely to be true; I distinguish the true measure of this— logical probability, from the best judgement of this that could be produced by a person using correct criteria but with limited abilities —epistemic probability, and from the measure that uses a person's own criteria—subjective probability. Whether or not a belief is rendered probable by its grounds (and so has adequate grounds) varies with the kind of probability being used.

Keywords:   adequate grounds, belief, epistemic probability, inductive probability, Keynes, logical probability, physical probability, probability, statistical probability, subjective probability

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