Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Epistemic Justification$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Richard Swinburne

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199243792

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199243794.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 16 July 2018

Belief

Belief

Chapter:
(p.32) 2 Belief
Source:
Epistemic Justification
Author(s):

Richard Swinburne (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199243794.003.0003

This book is concerned with narrow‐content beliefs. One believes ‘this’ proposition as against ‘that’ proposition (normally its negation); strength of belief is a matter (if one has the second order belief) of how much more probable one believes this proposition to be than that one. That belief is contrastive, and provides the solution to the Lottery Paradox. Beliefs are involuntary; we can have infallible access to them. A belief is the belief it is, in virtue of its logical relations to others of our beliefs The publicly observable input to a believer and his output in behaviour and speech are (fallible) evidence of his beliefs.

Keywords:   belief, content, narrow content, Lottery Paradox, Peacocke

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .