Realism or Idealism?
At the heart of Kant's distinction between things in themselves and phenomena is a distinction between two classes of properties, intrinsic and relational: on this interpretation, ignorance of things in themselves is not idealism. So why does Kant present his view as idealist ? One possible idealism is somewhat Leibnizian, if things in themselves are monad‐like subjects; the other is somewhat Berkeleian, if phenomena are spatial and space is ideal. Concession: Kant is an idealist about space, whether or not he ought to have been. But that is not the explanation for Humility; and since phenomena are constituted by real (albeit relational) forces, idealism about space is compatible with realism about phenomena.
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