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Political InstitutionsDemocracy and Social Choice$
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Josep M. Colomer

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199241835

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019924183X.001.0001

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Choosing Socially Efficient Institutions

Choosing Socially Efficient Institutions

Chapter:
(p.207) 5 Choosing Socially Efficient Institutions
Source:
Political Institutions
Author(s):

Josep M. Colomer (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019924183X.003.0005

Three types of political regimes are evaluated for their success in establishing stable and durable democracies. These are parliamentarism with majority electoral rules, parliamentarism with proportional representation, and presidentialism. An empirical analysis of the 123 attempts to establish democratic regimes in countries with more than one million inhabitants since the nineteenth century shows that parliamentarism with proportional representations is the formula with highest rates of success. This empirical finding supports the hypothesis that pluralistic political institutions have higher capability to produce socially efficient outcomes and obtain endogenous support.

Keywords:   democracy, democratization, parliamentarism, pluralism, political stability, presidentialism, proportional representation, social efficiency

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