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Knowing Our Own Minds$
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Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780199241408

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199241406.001.0001

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An Eye Directed Outward

An Eye Directed Outward

Chapter:
(p.99) 4 An Eye Directed Outward
Source:
Knowing Our Own Minds
Author(s):

M. G. F. Martin (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199241406.003.0005

The paper is a response to Peacocke's chapter. It begins by exploring and recasting his distinction between objects of attention and occupying attention. It goes on to consider cases of self‐ascription based on conscious episodes that are not authoritative, thereby suggesting that Peacocke's treatment needs a way to characterize the kinds of conscious thought, which can provide a rational basis for authoritative self‐ascription. One such kind of case is where knowledge of one's belief arises from one's apparent knowledge of how matters stand in the world. This raises a puzzle as to how directing our attention outward at the world should be to give rise to the knowledge of our own minds, and it is argued that Peacocke's possession‐conditions account of self‐ascription does nothing to solve it.

Keywords:   attention, authoritative self‐ascription, belief, conscious attitudes, Evans

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