Some Questions About Truth
The questions concerning truth that I plan to discuss are set up in a flowchart, and the answers to be defended in the course of the book are marked. I give my reasons for putting the Identity Theory aside (which takes truths to be facts), for bracketing Primitivism (which takes the concept of truth to be explanation‐resistant), and for shunning ‘deflationism/inflationism’ talk as underconstrained philosophical jargon. I explain what I mean by ‘alethic realism’ and ‘alethic anti‐realism’, and I argue (against Alston and D. Lewis) that the Denominalization Schema ‘It is true that p, iff p’ cannot be used as a lethal weapon against every anti‐realist conception of truth.
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