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Conceptions of Truth$

Wolfgang Künne

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199241316

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199241317.001.0001

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(p.455) Bibliography

(p.455) Bibliography

Source:
Conceptions of Truth
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Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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