Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Freedom and Reason
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Freedom and Reason

R. M. Hare

Abstract

Concerns the apparent antinomy between freedom and reason. Rationality appears to be a restraint on freedom, whereas freedom seems to be incompatible with rationality. Rejecting rationality to preserve freedom is the mark of subjectivist/emotivist theories of ethics. Rejecting freedom to emphasize rationality belongs to the naturalist/descriptivist theories. This book aims to reconcile these positions and do away with the alleged antinomy. The argument makes three main assumptions: (1) moral judgements are prescriptive; (2) they are universalizable; (3) there are genuine logical relations betw ... More

Keywords: descriptivism, freedom, ideals, interests, moral argument, moral conflict, moral judgement, naturalism, prescriptivism, reason

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 1965 Print ISBN-13: 9780198810926
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 DOI:10.1093/019881092X.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

R. M. Hare, author
University of Oxford

Subscriber Login

Forgotten your password?