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Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour$

Fernando Vega-Redondo

Print publication date: 1996

Print ISBN-13: 9780198774723

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198774729.001.0001

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(p.201) Bibliography

(p.201) Bibliography

Evolution, Games, and Economic Behaviour
Oxford University Press

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