Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Problems from Locke$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

J. L. Mackie

Print publication date: 1976

Print ISBN-13: 9780198750369

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198750366.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 22 March 2019

Abstract Ideas and Universals

Abstract Ideas and Universals

(p.107) 4 Abstract Ideas and Universals
Problems from Locke

J. L. Mackie

Oxford University Press

In this chapter, Mackie presents a defence of Locke against Berkeley's attack on abstraction. It is argued that Locke's theory of ideas primarily concerns our ability to employ words and statements. Locke's theory concerning ideas of numbers is criticized. Three theories of universals are considered: realism, nominalism, and conceptualism; it is concluded, however, that the notion of there being distinct things with which we connect general words with particular things is mistaken. Mackie instead proposes a theory of general words being ‘annexed’ to features of things.

Keywords:   abstract ideas, abstraction, Berkeley, conceptualism, nominalism, realism, universals

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .