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Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy$
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Susan Mendus

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780198297819

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198297815.001.0001

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Impartiality and Congruence

Impartiality and Congruence

Chapter:
(p.129) 4 Impartiality and Congruence
Source:
Impartiality in Moral and Political Philosophy
Author(s):

Susan Mendus (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198297815.003.0005

Argues that a form of impartialism that is grounded in the partial concerns we have for others can be shown to be congruent with the good of the agent, and that such congruence does not imply commitment to a specific comprehensive conception of the good. If correct, this argument has important consequences for liberalism at the political level. It suggests that the defence of stability, which Rawls advocates in A Theory of Justice need not depend upon commitment to a comprehensive, and Kantian, conception of the good. Justice can be shown to have moral priority, while at the same time acknowledging the permanence of pluralism about the good.

Keywords:   good, justice, Immanuel Kant, liberalism, moral impartialism, moral priority, pluralism, political impartialism, John Rawls, stability

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