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Governing with JudgesConstitutional Politics in Europe$
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Alec Stone Sweet

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198297710

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0198297718.001.0001

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Norms, Dispute Resolution, and Judicialization

Norms, Dispute Resolution, and Judicialization

Chapter:
(p.1) 1 Norms, Dispute Resolution, and Judicialization
Source:
Governing with Judges
Author(s):

Alec Stone Sweet

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198297718.003.0001

The regular and effective settlement of disputes by a third‐party dispute resolver leads to the evolution of a set of behavioural norms, which become authoritative in society. In turn, normative evolution shapes how interests are formed and power operates. In the context of constitutional law and politics, this system of reciprocal influence has led to the judicialization of European politics and the constitutionalization of European law. The final section of this chapter surveys a variety of perspectives on European constitutional politics, including a principal‐agent framework, the legislative politics approach, judicial decision‐making and conceptualizing legal normative autonomy.

Keywords:   Triadic dispute resolution, judicialization, norms, principal‐agent relationship, strategic behaviour

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