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Asset Pricing under Asymmetric InformationBubbles, Crashes, Technical Analysis, and Herding$

Markus K. Brunnermeier

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198296980

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198296983.001.0001

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(p.221) References

Source:
Asset Pricing under Asymmetric Information
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

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