The Distribution of Freedom
If freedom’s non-specific value is sufficiently strong, then freedom should be considered one of the currencies of distributive justice. A theorist who affirms that freedom is one of the currencies of distributive justice can be said to affirm a freedom-based theory of justice. Given such a theory, the definition of freedom should itself be independent of that of justice, and thus a non-moralized definition. A freedom-based theory of justice can contain various alternative principles for the distribution of freedom, such as maximal freedom, equal freedom, maximal equal freedom and maximin freedom. These principles in turn make varying demands on our powers of measuring freedom in terms of the possibility of interpersonal comparisons, cardinality and unidimensionality.
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