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The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions$

Gilles Saint-Paul

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198293323

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198293321.001.0001

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(p.269) Bibliography

(p.269) Bibliography

Source:
The Political Economy of Labour Market Institutions
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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