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The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions$
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Pranab Bardhan

Print publication date: 1991

Print ISBN-13: 9780198287629

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198287623.001.0001

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Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships

Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships

Chapter:
(p.93) 5. Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
Source:
The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions
Author(s):

Bhaskar Dutta

Debraj Ray (Contributor Webpage)

Kunal Sengupta

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198287623.003.0005

In this chapter, the authors use a model of an infinitely repeated principal‐agent relationship where they explore the conditions under which labour contracts with threats of sacking or contract termination will be equilibrium outcomes.

Keywords:   agents, equilibrium, eviction, infinite horizon, involuntary unemployment, labour, principal, repeated games, reservation utility, sacking

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