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The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions$
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Pranab Bardhan

Print publication date: 1991

Print ISBN-13: 9780198287629

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198287623.001.0001

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A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts

A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts

Chapter:
(p.73) 4. A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts
Source:
The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions
Author(s):

Clive Bell

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198287623.003.0004

Compares and contrasts the solutions yielded by principal‐agent and bargaining formulations of a tenancy contract.

Keywords:   agents, bargaining, disagreement payoffs, monitoring, principal, tenancy

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