- Title Pages
- Preface
- Contributors
- 1. Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development
- 2. Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics
- Part II Land and Labour
- 3. Theories of Sharecropping
- 4. A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts
- 5. Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
- 6. Production Relations in Semi‐Arid African Agriculture
- Part III Credit and Interlinked Transactions
- 7. Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency
- 8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure
- 9. Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality
- 10. On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
- 11. Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents
- 12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements
- 13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition
- Part IV Marketing and Insurance
- 14. Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization
- 15. Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts
- Part V Co‐Operatives, Technology, and the State
- 16. Agricultural Producer Co‐Operatives
- 17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives
- 18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State
- Bibliography
- Index
On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
- Chapter:
- (p.203) 10. On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
- Source:
- The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions
- Author(s):
T. N. Srinivasan
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
In this chapter, the author looks into the conditions under which borrowing under a voluntary ‘bonded labour’ contract (whereby one may repay loans by providing labour services at less than one's opportunity cost) will be chosen by a sharecropper, if another source of credit besides the landlord is available.
Keywords: bonded labour, credit ceiling, default, incentive compatibility, loans, opportunity cost, sharecropping
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
- Title Pages
- Preface
- Contributors
- 1. Alternative Approaches to the Theory of Institutions in Economic Development
- 2. Rational Peasants, Efficient Institutions, and a Theory of Rural Organization: Methodological Remarks for Development Economics
- Part II Land and Labour
- 3. Theories of Sharecropping
- 4. A Comparison of Principal–Agent and Bargaining Solutions: The Case of Tenancy Contracts
- 5. Contracts With Eviction in Infinitely Repeated Principal–Agent Relationships
- 6. Production Relations in Semi‐Arid African Agriculture
- Part III Credit and Interlinked Transactions
- 7. Rural Credit Markets: The Structure of Interest Rates, Exploitation, and Efficiency
- 8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure
- 9. Credit Rationing, Tenancy, Productivity, and the Dynamics of Inequality
- 10. On Choice Among Creditors and Bonded Labour Contracts
- 11. Some Aspects of Linked Product and Credit Market Contracts Among Risk‐Neutral Agents
- 12. A Note on Interlinked Rural Economic Arrangements
- 13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition
- Part IV Marketing and Insurance
- 14. Agricultural Institutions for Insurance and Stabilization
- 15. Peasants' Risk Aversion and the Choice of Marketing Intermediaries and Contracts: A Bargaining Theory of Equilibrium Marketing Contracts
- Part V Co‐Operatives, Technology, and the State
- 16. Agricultural Producer Co‐Operatives
- 17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives
- 18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State
- Bibliography
- Index
