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The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions$

Pranab Bardhan

Print publication date: 1991

Print ISBN-13: 9780198287629

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198287623.001.0001

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(p.383) Bibliography

(p.383) Bibliography

Source:
The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

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