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The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions
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The Economic Theory of Agrarian Institutions

Pranab Bardhan

Abstract

In this book, the authors theorize about the rationale and consequences of some economic institutions and contractual arrangements that are particularly predominant in poor agrarian economies. The models illustrate how some of the tools of advanced economic theory can be fruitfully used in understanding the aspects of age‐old agrarian institutions (like sharecropping, labour contracts, interlinked economic arrangements straddling labour, land, credit and product markets, producer and credit cooperatives, risk‐sharing institutions, etc.).

Keywords: adverse selection, agrarian economies, bargaining, bonded labour, contracts, credit rationing, insurance, moral hazard, principal‐agent model, sharecropping

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 1991 Print ISBN-13: 9780198287629
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 DOI:10.1093/0198287623.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Pranab Bardhan, editor
University of California, Berkeley
Author Webpage

Contents

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Part I General Introduction

6. Production Relations in Semi‐Arid African Agriculture

Hans Binswanger, John McIntire, and Chris Udry

8. Credit and Agrarian Class Structure

Mukesh Eswaran and Ashok Kotwal

13. Interlinkages and the Pattern of Competition

Debraj Ray and Kunal Sengupta

17. Institutional Analysis of Credit Co‐Operatives

Avishay Braverman and J. Luis Guasch

18. Agrarian Structure, Technological Innovations, and the State

Alain de Janvry, Elisabeth Sadoulet, and Marcel Fafchamps

End Matter