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Game Theory and Economic Modelling$
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David M. Kreps

Print publication date: 1990

Print ISBN-13: 9780198283812

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198283814.001.0001

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Bounded Rationality and Retrospection

Bounded Rationality and Retrospection

Chapter:
(p.133) 6 Bounded Rationality and Retrospection
Source:
Game Theory and Economic Modelling
Author(s):

David M. Kreps (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198283814.003.0006

Argues that many of the weaknesses of game theory arise from weaknesses in how economists model individual (dynamic) behaviour: with hyper‐rational and forward‐looking, farsighted individuals. Progress is likely to be made by re‐examining our models of behaviour, incorporating bounds to individual rationality and modelling individuals who are more retrospective, learning adaptively from the past.

Keywords:   adaptive learning, behavioural modelling, bounded rationality, dynamic choice, game theory, hyper‐rationality, retrospection

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