Show Summary Details
- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
- I The Problem
- 1 The Origins of Set Theory
- 2 Set Theory as a Foundation
- 3 The Standard Axioms
- 4 Independent Questions
- 5 New Axiom Candidates
- 6 V = L
- II Realism
- 1 Gödelian Realism
- 2 Quinean Realism
- 3 Set Theoretic Realism
- 4 A Realist's Case Against V = L
- 5 Hints of Trouble
- 6 Indispensability and Scientific Practice
- 7 Indispensability and Mathematical Practice
- III Naturalism
- 1 Wittgensteinian Anti‐Philosophy
- 2 A Second Gödelian Theme
- 3 Quinean Naturalism
- 4 Mathematical Naturalism
- 5 The Problem Revisited
- 6 A Naturalist's Case Against V = L
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
5 The Problem Revisited
5 The Problem Revisited
- Chapter:
- (p.206) 5 The Problem Revisited
- Source:
- Naturalism in Mathematics
- Author(s):
Penelope Maddy (Contributor Webpage)
- Publisher:
- Oxford University Press
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- Title Pages
- Dedication
- Preface
- I The Problem
- 1 The Origins of Set Theory
- 2 Set Theory as a Foundation
- 3 The Standard Axioms
- 4 Independent Questions
- 5 New Axiom Candidates
- 6 V = L
- II Realism
- 1 Gödelian Realism
- 2 Quinean Realism
- 3 Set Theoretic Realism
- 4 A Realist's Case Against V = L
- 5 Hints of Trouble
- 6 Indispensability and Scientific Practice
- 7 Indispensability and Mathematical Practice
- III Naturalism
- 1 Wittgensteinian Anti‐Philosophy
- 2 A Second Gödelian Theme
- 3 Quinean Naturalism
- 4 Mathematical Naturalism
- 5 The Problem Revisited
- 6 A Naturalist's Case Against V = L
- Conclusion
- Bibliography
- Index
