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From Metaphysics to EthicsA Defence of Conceptual Analysis$
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Frank Jackson

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250616

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198250614.001.0001

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Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysical Necessity

Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysical Necessity

Chapter:
(p.56) Chapter 3 Conceptual Analysis and Metaphysical Necessity
Source:
From Metaphysics to Ethics
Author(s):

Frank Jackson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198250614.003.0003

Work by Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke has made us sensitive to the distinction between metaphysical necessity and conceptual necessity, and between being necessary and being a priori. This chapter relates these matters to the discussion of conceptual analysis given in Ch. 2 and uses the apparatus of two‐dimensional modal logic and the associated distinction between A‐intensions and C‐intensions (or primary and secondary intensions, respectively, in David Chalmers’ terms) to argue that physicalism is committed to the thesis that the mental is in principle a priori derivable from the physical.

Keywords:   Chalmers, conceptual analysis, intension, Kripke, Modal logic, necessity, physicalism, Putnam

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