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Hume's ProblemInduction and the Justification of Belief$
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Colin Howson

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198250371

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198250371.001.0001

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The Naturalistic Fallacy

The Naturalistic Fallacy

Chapter:
(p.109) 6 The Naturalistic Fallacy
Source:
Hume's Problem
Author(s):

Colin Howson (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198250371.003.0007

Considers another popular way of evading the force of Hume's argument, Naturalism. According to this doctrine, Hume merely shows why we must give up trying to find top–down justifications for our scientific procedures. Instead, we should use scientific procedures to investigate ways of acquiring knowledge. Naturalism is closely related to Reliabilism, like it claiming that the ordinary canons of evidence are all we need to underwrite the reliability of ordinary inductive procedures. These claims are investigated and shown to rest on a version of the Naturalistic Fallacy.

Keywords:   Darwin, naturalism, Naturalistic Fallacy, Quine, realism

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