Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
IgnoranceA Case for Scepticism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Peter Unger

Print publication date: 1978

Print ISBN-13: 9780198244172

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198244177.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 14 December 2018

Where Ignorance Enjoins Silence

Where Ignorance Enjoins Silence

(p.250) VI Where Ignorance Enjoins Silence

Peter Unger (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Argues that if someone asserts that something is so, this entails that he or she represents himself or herself as knowing that it is so. This hypothesis is supported by consideration of a modified version of Moore's Paradox, and by observation of conversational situations. A prima facie case is made for the claim that the hypothesis can be generalized for what J. L. Austin has called “illocutionary acts” (for instance, apologizing, commanding, questioning, etc.): whenever a subject performs such an act, it represents itself as knowing something.

Keywords:   assertion, J. L. Austin, conversation, illocutionary acts, knowledge, Moore's Paradox

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .