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Knowledge and the State of NatureAn Essay in Conceptual Synthesis$
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Edward Craig

Print publication date: 1999

Print ISBN-13: 9780198238799

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198238797.001.0001

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Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case

Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case

Chapter:
(p.11) II Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case
Source:
Knowledge and the State of Nature
Author(s):

Edward Craig (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198238797.003.0002

Outlines the core of the author's theory, according to which the concept of knowledge arises because of our interest in having true beliefs about our environment and thus in evaluating sources of information, and is used to flag approved ones. The hypothesis is used to account for epistemologists’ disagreement over the precise nature of the belief condition for knowledge. Ground is conceded to those who play down the requirement, in so far as an informant's being confident that p is not always taken as necessary for her to be a good informant. Equally, cases in which an informant is regarded as good, yet lacks belief entirely, are freakish and thus of little practical use, which explains both the attraction of the requirement and the feeling that there are genuine counter‐examples to it.

Keywords:   belief, belief condition, confidence, information, knowledge, practical utility, source, true belief, truth

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