- Title Pages
- I Nature and motivation of project. Doubts answered. Plato, Pears, Hobbes, comparison with State‐of‐Nature Theory in Political Philosophy. Evolutionary epistemology
- II Derivation of first condition; the problem whether belief necessary. Necessary and sufficient conditions an unsuitable format. The prototypical case
- III Need for third condition. Discussion of the Nozick‐Dretske analysis
- IV Why causal theory, tracking, reliabilism all good approximations. Why justified true belief a good approximation. Comparison with Grice
- V Distinction between Informant and Source of Information; its nature and point. Application to putative ‘knowledge without belief’ cases; and to comparativism: Goldman
- VI Being right by accident. All analyses insufficient. Blackburn: the Mirv/Pirv principle
- VII Local v. Global Reliabilism. Discussion of McGinn
- VIII Externalist and Internalist analyses. The first‐person case. Knowing that one knows
- IX Insufficiency of the various analyses. The ‘No false lemma’ principle. Its rationale—and its effect
- X Objectivisation. The ‘cart before the horse’ objection—and the response
- XI Lotteries and multiple premises: the pull towards certainty. Knowledge and natural laws
- XII Objectivisation and scepticism. Unger's first account
- XIII Two explanations of scepticism: the first‐person approach, and the absolute perspective
- XIV Knowledge and involvement. What makes truth valuable?
- XV Testimony and the transmission of knowledge. Welbourne: believing the speaker
- XVI Other locutions: Knowing Fred. Information v. acquaintance. Interacting with Fred. Knowing London—and German
- XVII Other locutions: Knowing how to. The Inquirer and the Apprentice. ‘Knows how to’ compared with ‘can’—and with ‘knows that’
- Appendix: Unger's Semantic Relativism
- Index of Names
- Knowledge and the State of Nature
- Oxford University Press
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