Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Respect, Pluralism, and JusticeKantian Perspectives$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Thomas E. Hill

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198238348

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198238347.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 April 2018

Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?

Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?

(p.173) 7 Kant on Punishment: A Coherent Mix of Deterrence and Retribution?
Respect, Pluralism, and Justice

Thomas E. Hill (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Although Kant is often regarded an extreme retributivist regarding judicial punishment, the need to deter crime also plays a significant role in his theory of criminal law. Kant's special way of combining deterrence and retribution, however, must be distinguished from others that are less plausible. Kant thought that criminal punishments should be designed to match the victim's empirically discernible losses in degree and kind, except when this would be impossible or degrading; for courts cannot measure the ultimate moral desert of criminals. Arguably, Kant's justification of the practice of punishment is not deeply retributive, but punishment is also not a mere disincentive in a ‘price’ system of social control. For better or worse, punishment tends to convey a public message of moral disapproval of the criminal conduct; and, though this de facto expressive function is not for Kant, the purpose or justification of punishment, it may help explain his concern for making the severity of punishments proportional to the gravity of crimes and his refusal to allow exceptions for merely pragmatic reasons.

Keywords:   criminal law, deterrence, expressive function, Kant, moral desert, moral disapproval, punishment, retribution

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .