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Subjective, Intersubjective, ObjectivePhilosophical Essays Volume 3$
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Donald Davidson

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237532

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198237537.001.0001

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The Myth of the Subjective

The Myth of the Subjective

Chapter:
(p.39) 3 The Myth of the Subjective
Source:
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
Author(s):

Donald Davidson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198237537.003.0003

This chapter is a direct attack on the idea of a subjective–objective dichotomy resulting in a fundamental distinction between uninterpreted experience and an organizing structure of concepts. Consequently, Davidson attacks the foundation of all metaphysical and epistemological dualisms and the philosophical stances based upon them. He attempts to make a case for their replacement by a view that combines the denial of objects before the mind with the claim that empirical knowledge does not and need not have an epistemological foundation.

Keywords:   concepts, empirical knowledge, epistemological foundation, metaphysical and epistemological dualisms, subjective–objective dichotomy

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