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Subjective, Intersubjective, ObjectivePhilosophical Essays Volume 3$
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Donald Davidson

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237532

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198237537.001.0001

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Empirical Content

Empirical Content

Chapter:
(p.159) 11 Empirical Content
Source:
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
Author(s):

Donald Davidson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198237537.003.0011

Explores Schlick's and Neurath's dispute over the foundations of empirical knowledge, and thereby equips ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge’ with commentary and historical background. Davidson works out the difficulties involved in drawing epistemological conclusions from a verificationist theory of meaning and argues that there are promising hints of a better theory, akin to Davidson's coherence theory of truth and knowledge, in the logical positivists’ writings.

Keywords:   coherence, empirical content, epistemology, foundations of empirical knowledge, knowledge, logical positivism, Neurath, Schlick, truth, verificationist theory of meaning

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