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Subjective, Intersubjective, ObjectivePhilosophical Essays Volume 3$
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Donald Davidson

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198237532

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198237537.001.0001

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A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge

A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge

Chapter:
(p.137) 10 A Coherence Theory of Truth and Knowledge
Source:
Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective
Author(s):

Donald Davidson

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0198237537.003.0010

In this chapter, a set of replies to Richard Rorty's then‐pragmatist criticisms, Davidson defends a coherence theory of truth that is not incompatible but in fact yields a correspondence theory. He argues that the common ground for the theories are considerations of meaning and the objective truth‐conditions that state when meanings are given. Coherence, then, is supposed to be a test for both truth and the judgement that objective truth‐conditions are justified, yielding what Davidson calls a ‘non‐confrontational’ correspondence and a realist stance in all departments involved.

Keywords:   coherence, correspondence, knowledge, meaning, ‘non‐confrontational’ correspondence, objective truth‐conditions, pragmatism, realism, Richard Rorty, truth

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