Referring to Eternal God
Discusses the issue of whether an eternal God could be successfully referred to. To argue that such reference may be successful, a distinction between identity and identification is drawn, and Kripke's distinction between giving the meaning of an expression and fixing its reference is employed. It is argued that God's reference may be fixed, and so reference to particulars and to God (assuming that God is a particular) is not necessarily empirical and spatio–temporal in character.
Keywords: empirical, identification, identity, Kripke, meaning, reference, spatio–temporal
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