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The Reason's Proper StudyEssays towards a Neo-Fregean Philosophy of Mathematics$
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Bob Hale and Crispin Wright

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780198236399

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198236395.001.0001

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Is Platonism Epistemologically Bankrupt?

Is Platonism Epistemologically Bankrupt?

(p.169) 7 Is Platonism Epistemologically Bankrupt?
The Reason's Proper Study

Bob Hale (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This paper argues that the epistemological challenge against a Platonist conception of mathematics can be met. The challenge is expounded in a general version and does not rely on the specific adoption of a causal theory of knowledge, but rather it disputes the ability to explain our reliability of our beliefs concerning abstract objects. It is then argued that for a Platonist, the above challenge can be met by giving a satisfactory epistemology of necessary truths in general. That is to reduce the explanation of our reliability in mathematical beliefs to beliefs of necessary statements as such. In the following, the worry is raised that such a transition is illicit, as it might still be the case that albeit logical beliefs are necessary, our mathematical beliefs, even if they were true are never necessarily so.

Keywords:   Benacerraf, contingency, epistemology, Hartry Field, logical consequence, necessity, Platonism

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