Language and Truth
According to one view, it is as absurd to explain the notion of truth in general as it is to explain the notion of winning the game for an arbitrary game. Knowing what it takes to win the game is inseparable from knowing what the game consists in. Far from showing the absence of a philosophical problem about truth, this argument establishes the link between the concept of truth and the concept of meaning. The meaning of a sentence should be given in terms of the procedure in which this sentence may be verified. Hence, the notion of verification may play a part of the theoretical rôle usually ascribed to the notion of truth, even if the latter might not be wholly explainable in terms of the former.
Keywords: Frege, meaning, Quine, truth, truth‐conditions, Wittgenstein
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