Frege and Husserl on Reference
David Bell argued in his book Husserl that Frege's notion of reference was realist, whereas Husserl's notion of reference in Logical Investigations was non‐realist. The suitable notion of reference should reconcile between extensional and intensional modes of speaking of the object. According to Husserl, intentional objects do not form an ontological category: to speak of them is to adopt the material mode of saying what, in the formal mode, relates to a singular term standing in an intensional context. Thus, Husserl's solution closely resembles Frege's, and both are essentially realist ones.
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