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Strategic Interaction and Markets$

Jean J. Gabszewicz

Print publication date: 2000

Print ISBN-13: 9780198233411

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0198233418.001.0001

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(p.88) References

(p.88) References

Source:
Strategic Interaction and Markets
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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