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Pyrrhonian Skepticism$
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Walter Sinnott-Armstrong

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195169720

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0195169727.001.0001

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Commercial Applications of Skepticism

Commercial Applications of Skepticism

(p.208) 11 Commercial Applications of Skepticism
Pyrrhonian Skepticism

Roy Sorensen (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This essay argues that Pyrrhonian skeptics, including Fogelin, are conditional skeptics, and hence not really skeptics at all. Conditional skeptics refute themselves, for when they assert conditionals, they make assertions. Since these conditionals are philosophical in content, Pyrrhonians do not avoid all philosophical assertions as they claim to do.

Keywords:   Fogelin, skepticism, Pyrrhonian, conditional, ignorance, knowledge, philosophical assertions

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